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Abstract: Is the integration of occupational pension regulations across the Canadian 
provinces feasible? In this paper, we assess the proposal for harmonization made by the 
Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA) by comparing it to 
the EU’s successful integration of member states’ pension regulations. We argue that 
CAPSA’s initiative failed both because regulatory diversity was defined as a 
fundamental problem and because the regulations that serve social policy goals were 
not protected from integration. We suggest that occupational pension integration in 
Canada would be feasible if provincial governments largely excluded rules on benefits 
and relied primarily on the mutual recognition of regulations. 
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Résumé: Est-il possible d’harmoniser les règlementations régissant les régimes de 
pension complémentaires entre les provinces canadiennes ? Dans cet article, nous 
évaluons la proposition d'harmonisation faite par l’Association canadienne des 
organismes de contrôle des régimes de retraite (ACOR) en la comparant à 
l’harmonisation réussie des réglementations régissant les régimes de pension 
complémentaire des États membres de l’Union Européenne. Nous soutenons que 
l'initiative de l’ACOR a principalement échoué pour deux raisons. La diversité des 
règlementations a été considérée comme un problème fondamental et les 
règlementations qui adressent les objectifs de la  politique sociale n'ont pas été protégés 
par le processus d'intégration. Nous pensons qu’il soit possible d’harmoniser les 
régimes de pension complémentaire au Canada  si les gouvernements provinciaux 
excluent  les règles régissant les avantages sociaux et se basent principalement sur la 
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Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the integration of occupational pension regulations across 
jurisdictions has been on the agenda of governments, regulators, and supervisors in 
many advanced industrialized countries, mostly at the international level. In Canada, it 
was on the agenda also at the domestic level, because, in a unique arrangement, 
employer pension plans are regulated by the provinces. At the international level, the 
OECD member countries recently agreed on principles for regulating and supervising 
pensions that cover issues such as funding and investment (OECD 2004a, 2004b); the 
European Union member states delegated the responsibility for regulating and 
supervising cross-border pension funds to the authority in their respective home state 
and established CEIOPS, a new intergovernmental committee for coordinating the 
activities of regulatory and supervisory authorities, which is charged with increasing 
convergence in pension supervision (CEIOPS 2005).
1 At the domestic level, the 
Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA) recently proposed 
more than 40 principles of pension regulation and supervision, which would lead to 
more integration across the Canadian federation if they were adopted by the provincial 
governments (CAPSA 2004, 2005). In addition, the government of Ontario, which 
                                                 
1 The acronym CEIOPS stands for Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Supervisors. Its counterpart at the global level is IOPS, the International 
Organization of Pension Supervisors, which was created by 40 countries in 2004. IOPS 
seeks to promote cross-national cooperation and to serve as the international standard-
setter in occupational pension supervision.   3
regulates the large majority of Canadian pension plans, considered the issue of 
harmonizing regulations in its review of occupational pension legislation (Expert 
Commission on Pensions 2007). 
Even though governments have paid increasing attention to the issue of 
occupational pension integration, their decision-making has been slow and so far 
progress has been limited. It took the European Union more than 10 years to adopt its 
new occupational pensions framework, and it is still not clear whether or not it will be 
able to remove all barriers to the cross-border provision and membership in 
occupational pension schemes. Most member states missed the 2005 deadline for 
transposing the EU’s legislation on the Activities and Supervision of Institutions for 
Occupational Retirement Provision, commonly known as the pension fund directive, 
into national laws (Council of the European Union 2003). The European Parliament 
was concerned that even the governments that implemented this directive would try to 
limit its force (European Parliament 2005). The Canadian provinces agreed on a 
Memorandum of Reciprocal Understanding in 1968, and have surprisingly neither 
changed nor updated this agreement in the almost 40 years since, even though, as many 
recent court cases have shown, many issues of regulating and administering 
occupational pension plans across jurisdictions remain unsettled (Kaplan 2006 115-
124). The efforts of provincial regulators to develop a Pension Model Law, which has 
received a lot of attention from plan sponsors, trade unions, and the financial services 
industry, has not convinced provincial governments to launch an initiative for deeper 
integration. Both in the EU and Canada, the progress that has been made in 
coordinating occupational pension regulations is small compared to that which has been   4
achieved in integrating other areas of financial services. The European Commission 
deepened integration in both banking and securities regulation by implementing the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) (Grahl and Teague 2005). The federal 
government assumed most of the responsibilities in Canadian banking regulation 
(Coleman 2002), and all provinces except Ontario recently created a passport system 
for securities regulation (Provincial-Territorial Ministers Responsible for Securities 
Regulation 2004). 
In this paper, we analyze why it is so difficult to integrate occupational 
pensions, and how existing obstacles might be overcome. We evaluate whether or not 
occupational pension integration in Canada is feasible by analyzing the form and 
strategies of integration in the European Union. In both jurisdictions, governments 
made similar attempts to coordinate or harmonize pension regulations, but had different 
degrees of success. Even though European policy-makers faced a much greater 
diversity and a much lower level of coordination among occupational pension systems 
than Canadian ones, they successfully enacted new legislation. The outcome in Canada 
was different: provincial policy-makers did not respond to the regulators’ proposal for 
more integration, and neither initiated new legislation nor revised the existing 
Reciprocal Agreement. By comparing the strategies of integration across two multi-
level political systems that are similar in the area of pension regulation, we are able to 
draw lessons from the European experience for the Canadian case (Rose 1993, 2005).  
Specifically, we will analyze the content of the successful proposal made by the 
European Commission and compare it to CAPSA’s unsuccessful proposal of Principles 
for a Model Pension Law.   5
We develop two arguments in this paper. The first one is that occupational 
pension regulations are more difficult to integrate than other financial services 
regulations because they are only weakly affected by pressures from the global 
economy and, most importantly, are significant instruments for achieving social policy 
goals. The second argument is that EU policy-makers used two strategies that made the 
integration of occupational pension regulations feasible: they respected the diversity of 
the existing occupational pension systems, and they protected existing regulations that 
embody social policy goals, focusing their efforts exclusively on financial regulations. 
By defining the problems of fragmentation and setting the scope of integration in these 
ways, they were able to overcome the obstacles to integration. Our arguments imply 
that Canadian policy-makers would also be able to overcome existing difficulties if 
they framed the problems differently and exempted social regulations from integration. 
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, we discuss two obstacles 
to integration: the lack of pressures to place occupational pensions on the political 
agenda and the problem of integrating social policies across jurisdictions. In the second 
part, we compare the strategies of the European Commission and CAPSA for 
overcoming the difficulties in getting policy-makers’ attention. In the third part, we 
compare the strategies of EU and Canadian agenda-setters for circumventing the 
problem of diverse policy legacies in occupational pensions. In the conclusion of this 
paper, we discuss the lessons that Canadian policy-makers may learn from the 
European Union’s experience with integrating pension regulations.   6
Obstacles to Integrating Occupational Pension Regulations 
Why is it so difficult to integrate occupational pension regulations? The issue of 
occupational pensions has two features that create difficulties in first getting it on the 
political agenda and then in adopting legislation: the low salience of this issue on 
policy-makers’ agenda and the commitments of governments and interest groups to the 
values embodied in a number of occupational pension regulations. These commitments 
are known in the literature as policy legacies.
2 The first feature of the occupational 
pensions is that, since it is rarely a salient issue for voters, it does not play an important 
role in elections and party competition. It shares this feature with other areas of highly 
technical financial services policy (Coleman 1996). Policy-makers thus pay attention to 
financial services policy if they are facing either an internal crisis or external pressures. 
Recent occupational pension reforms are an example of policy-makers’ reaction to a 
crisis. Federal and provincial governments considered or adopted reforms of their 
pension benefits standards legislation in response to growing funding shortfalls in 
employer pension plans in Canada, which threatened the security of benefits and 
created instability for the financial system (Kaplan 2006, 84-86; Bank of Canada 2004). 
The funding crisis motivated policy-makers to reform occupational pensions, but did 
not lead them to become interested in more regulatory integration within Canada. This 
response could have been expected since provincial policy-makers are able to respond 
more quickly and flexibly to a crisis if they can adapt pension regulations 
                                                 
2 On issue salience and agenda-setting, see (Kingdon 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993, 2002); on policy legacies, see (Heclo 1974; Weir et al. 1988; Pierson 1993).   7
independently. They are unlikely to pursue integration when they are faced with 
pension funding shortfalls. Thus, the current round of reforms repeats the experiences 
of that of the 1980s, which led to greater, not smaller, differences across the provinces 
(CLC 2004, 5). Thus, even though occupational pensions have extraordinarily been on 
governments’ agendas in recent years, regulatory integration did not become an issue. 
The recent coordination of securities policies in Canada is an example of policy-
makers’ reaction to external pressures. Because of the globalization of financial 
markets, Canada’s fragmented regulatory system has become increasingly inefficient 
(Coleman 1992, 2002). The Wise Persons’ Committee, which had been created by the 
federal government, concluded from its study that the regulation of securities in Canada 
had to become more integrated across the provinces if the competitiveness of Canadian 
capital markets in the global economy was to be maintained (Committee to Review the 
Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada 2003). In response to these external 
pressures, provincial policy-makers launched the Provincial-Territorial Securities 
Initiative, which led to a new system of securities regulation based on the principle of 
mutual recognition: the so-called passport system (Provincial-Territorial Council of 
Ministers of Securities Regulation 2007).
3 The integration of occupational pension 
regulations does not play a significant role in the competitiveness of the Canadian 
economy on the global stage. Thus, provincial policy-makers are not under pressure to 
                                                 
3 EU policy-makers also reacted to the changes in the international economic 
environment, proposing the Financial Services Action Plan. Since the member states 
saw the issue of integration as urgent, they even agreed on a new and fast process of 
decision-making, named the Lamfalussy process, which delegated powers from the 
Council of Ministers to the European Commission, high-level ministerial 
representatives from each country, and national securities regulators.   8
act in this area. For example, while they were willing to create a new Council of 
Ministers in the area of securities regulation, provincial policy-makers have not even 
considered the formation of an intergovernmental forum for pension regulation. 
The second feature of occupational pension regulations is that they embody 
social policy goals that are highly valued by some governments and interest groups. 
Even though the area of occupational pensions is often seen as similar to other areas of 
financial services policy, it differs significantly from, for example, that of securities and 
banking. Most aspects of pension regulations are just as technical as those of other 
financial services regulations: they deal with issues of pension plan supervision, such as 
registration and information requirements, and with funding and investment rules, 
including the definition and calculation of assets and liabilities, the required level of 
funding, and rules on diversification. But other aspects, especially issues of social 
protection, make occupational pension regulations distinct. They reflect choices about 
the character of occupational pensions, the responsibilities of the state, and the role of 
regulation. For example, in some EU member states, occupational pension plans are 
modeled after public pension programs that guarantee a defined level of income and 
other benefits until or even after a person’s death and are regulated as a form of 
insurance. This type of occupational pensions contrasts with another type which 
imposes few restrictions, for example on lump-sum withdrawals, lacks requirements, 
such as the annuitisation of benefits and the provision of survivors’ pensions, and 
regulates occupational pension plans as a special category of financial products, not as 
a form of insurance, which often leads to a low degree of regulation and supervision 
(Queisser 1998; De Ryck 1996). The differences between occupational pension systems   9
in Canada are much smaller than that between those in the EU, but the Canadian 
provinces nonetheless have distinctive rules about benefits which embody values and 
social policy goals, such as broad coverage and adequate and secure benefits. For 
example, Manitoba makes plan membership compulsory, Quebec requires benefit 
indexation, and Ontario provides enhanced protection for early retirement benefits, so-
called grow-in rights. 
These variations in social policy goals and pension regulations create barriers 
against the coordination, convergence and harmonization of occupational pension 
systems that do not exist in other areas of financial services. Since financial issues are 
regarded as highly technical, they are often discussed and resolved by small policy 
networks, and thus dealt with outside of high-level politics (Coleman 1996). A good 
example of successful policy-making by experts is the EU’s Lamfalussy process which 
delegated power to a circle of specialists from ministries, regulators, and interest 
groups. In the Council of Ministers, decisions about the Financial Services Action Plan 
faced multiple long delays; in two newly created expert bodies, the European Securities 
Committee and the Committee of European Securities Regulators, they were made 
within only a few years (Grahl and Teague 2005). Issues that concern social policy 
goals are different: most of them cannot be resolved by small groups of policy experts 
because of disagreements about values and goals; and they lead to conflicts among 
governments, political parties and interest groups if they become part of the broader 
political discourse. Examples that illustrate these difficulties are both the great 
reluctance of EU policy-makers to build a European welfare state (Scharpf 2002) and 
the only partial success of Canadian policy-makers to develop uniform social programs   10
(Banting 2005). Thus, because governments, parties, and interest groups are committed 
to occupational pension regulations that serve social policy goals and are willing to 
defend them against efforts of change, political agreement on harmonization or a higher 
level of regulatory integration is difficult to reach. Even CAPSA, an optimistic 
proponent of harmonization, recognizes the existence of this obstacle and 
acknowledges that “certain pension standards unique and important to certain 
jurisdictions would likely be maintained because the governments would be highly 
reluctant to abandon them” (CIA 2004, 5). 
Defining the Problem of Regulatory Fragmentation 
Since strong economic pressures for occupational pension integration are 
absent, how could administrators and regulators overcome the difficulties in placing 
occupational pension integration on policy-makers’ agenda? Policy-makers are more 
likely to pay attention to an issue if policy problems are well-defined, and a compelling 
problem definition exists (Kingdon 1995; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Perhaps most 
importantly, in order to convince policy-makers of the necessity and desirability of 
policy reform, the definition of problems needs to build upon long-standing values 
(Schmidt 2000). Thus, in order to get the integration of occupational pension 
regulations on the governmental agenda, it is important to frame this issue 
convincingly. In this section, we compare how the European Commission and CAPSA, 
which were the key agenda-setters in the EU and Canada, defined the problem of 
regulatory fragmentation, and analyze whether or not their problem definitions were 
successful.   11
The European Commission’s framing of the problems of occupational pension 
regulation was primarily based on the shared values of European policy-makers, which 
are embodied in the EU Treaty: the freedom of provision of services and the free 
movement of workers. In the Green Paper on Supplementary Pensions in the Single 
Market, a consultation paper released in 1997, the Commission argued that some of the 
rules that applied to occupational pensions restricted these two freedoms (European 
Commission 1997a). Most importantly, rules on investment of pension funds 
constrained the freedom of fund managers to offer their services across the EU, and 
rules on eligibility for pension benefits restricted employees from taking up jobs in a 
different member state. The Commission thus focused on only two aspects of 
occupational pension regulation: first, quantitative restrictions on pension investments, 
and second, conditions for the acquisition and transfer of pension rights. Regarding the 
former, it argued that the rules that define upper limits for particular assets, especially 
for equities, could “have the effect of frustrating the Single Market” and often “go 
beyond what is objectively necessary to maintain adequate prudential supervision” 
(European Commission 1997a, 10). Regarding the latter, the Commission argued that 
long vesting periods and the inability to transfer vested pension rights to a pension 
scheme in another member state were “severe obstacles to labour mobility” (European 
Commission 1997a, 16). It also argued that EU regulations had been enacted only for 
public pensions, but not for occupational ones, even though neither one should prevent 
the free movement of workers across borders (European Commission 1997a). 
In addition to appealing to policy-makers’ shared values of free service 
provision and free labour mobility, the Commission made an argument about costs and   12
benefits, pointing out that regulatory integration would make the provision of 
occupational pensions “more efficient” and thus contribute to the latter’s ability to 
compensate for the likely reduction of public pensions in a period of major 
demographic change (European Commission 1997a, 12). Specifically, integration could 
result in higher rates of return for pension funds if governments agreed on both the 
removal of “disproportionate restrictions” on investments and the introduction of the 
prudent-person principle. However, potential cost savings played only a minor role in 
the Commission’s problem definition. The Commission could have pursued efficiency 
gains through regulatory harmonization, but did not adopt this strategy. Instead, it 
regarded most aspects of occupational pension regulation in member states as 
compatible with the single market and applied the EU’s principle of subsidiarity to the 
rules about occupational pension benefits, emphasizing that “it is for member states to 
decide on the role they wish each of [the] three sources of pension provision to play in 
providing retirement” (European Commission 1997a, I). In addition, the Commission 
did not regard all differences in prudential rules as a problem. It accepted the status quo 
as long as the rules were broadly compatible with the freedom to provide services in the 
EU. 
CAPSA’s framing of the problem of regulatory fragmentation was very 
different from the European Commission’s. The provincial regulators justified their 
initiative for more integration with two objectives: efficiency in administering 
occupational pension schemes and harmonization of pension benefits across 
jurisdictions. Unlike the European Commission’s reasons for integration, CAPSA’s 
were not based on shared, long-standing values: the first goal reflected only   13
instrumental considerations about costs and benefits, and the second was guided by the 
value of regulatory uniformity, which was neither rooted in a constitutional provision 
nor accepted by provincial policy-makers. In Proposed Regulatory Principles for a 
Model Pension Law, a consultation paper published in 2004, CAPSA argued that there 
were a significant number of pension plans in Canada that had members in multiple 
jurisdictions and thus “must comply with different legislative requirements in each 
jurisdiction, resulting in administrative complexity …” (CAPSA 2004, 1). According to 
CAPSA, the costs created by regulatory differences across the provinces were one of 
the reasons for employees’ stagnant or declining coverage by occupational pensions. In 
addition, CAPSA stressed that there were too many, and often very large, differences 
among provincial pension benefit provisions. For example, the level of survivor 
benefits and the level of death benefits varied across jurisdictions. The regulators 
defined the “inconsistent treatment of plan members in different jurisdictions” (CAPSA 
2004, 2) as the key problem, not only because it made plan administration complex if 
employees moved to another province, but also because it created uncertainties for 
these employee. Unlike the European Commission, which focused on a very limited set 
of regulations, disregarding most differences across member states, the Canadian 
regulators had a comprehensive perspective on cross-provincial differences in pension 
regulation, discussing, for example, variations in pension plan governance, plan types, 
prudential rules, eligibility conditions, and design features such as phased retirement 
and pension splitting. CAPSA saw all of these differences as a problem. 
Policy-makers’ responses to the problem definitions given by the European 
Commission and CAPSA differed significantly: the member state governments   14
supported the Commission’s initiative, and the provincial governments ignored 
CAPSA’s attempt. We argue that the Commission’s framing of the problem of 
regulatory fragmentation, which was based on institutionalized values, contributed to 
its success in placing the issue of occupational pension integration on the European 
Union’s agenda, and that CAPSA’s reliance on instrumental goals and contested values 
led to a cold response from provincial governments. 
In the European Union, the initial reactions from member states and interest 
groups were mostly favorable. They broadly agreed on the principles formulated by the 
Commission and on the definition of the problems. Summarizing the member states’ 
responses, the Commission stressed that “all contributors endorse the right of fund 
managers to offer their services freely throughout the Union” and that there was a 
“broad consensus on the approach taken by the Commission in order to remove barriers 
to free movement” (European Commission 1997b, 7). All member states supported 
even the idea of an EU Directive on safeguarding the occupational pension benefits of 
workers who move across borders. The Commission was largely successful in creating 
a shared problem definition, but could not resolve every difference. Member states 
disagreed about the relative importance of some characteristics of occupational pension 
regulations. For example, many governments saw the transferability of pension rights 
as “a real problem which has a greater impact on the rights of workers moving to a 
different member state than on the rights of those changing jobs within the same 
member state” (European Commission 1997b, 26), but they did not see long vesting 
periods as a real barrier to the free movement of workers. Like the member state 
governments, the key interest groups in the occupational pensions sector, employer   15
organizations and trade unions, reacted favorably to the Commission’s framing of the 
policy problems. The Economic and Social Committee (ESC), which represents both 
employers and employees in the EU’s policy-making process, supported the 
Commission’s argument that “it is necessary if the single market is to be realized that 
freedom of fund management is established” and that long vesting periods and 
restrictions on transferability of pension rights “represent important obstacles to the free 
movement of workers and are inconsistent with the concept of a single market” 
(Economic and Social Committee 1998, 117). The focus on two of the key values of the 
European Union, the freedom to provide services across borders and the freedom to 
work in different countries, thus enabled the Commission to shape the agenda of the 
Council of Ministers in which the member state governments are represented. 
In Canada, the initial reactions of provincial governments to CAPSA’s Pension 
Model Law were neither positive nor openly negative; they were absent. Governments 
did not make official statements regarding the problem definition proposed by their 
own regulatory agencies. The lack of responses indicates either weak or no support, and 
possibly opposition to more integration of occupational pension systems. Most 
provincial governments thought that more integration would not be feasible and that 
even an update of the Reciprocal Agreement would be very difficult to achieve (CIA 
2004, 5). Unlike the key interest groups in the European Union, which welcomed 
initiatives for more regulatory integration, those in Canada either found CAPSA’s 
problem definition too limited or entirely inadequate. The responses of the employers 
and the trade unions to the consultation paper show that these groups saw the problems 
of occupational pension regulation very differently and did not agree with CAPSA. The   16
Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM), which represents the interest 
of both employers and the pension industry, regarded regulatory diversity and extensive 
regulation as major problems. It saw the existing “patchwork of pension legislation” as 
an obstacle to occupational pension provision and found that a large number of 
regulations, such as partial wind-ups, restrictions on surplus withdrawals, grow-in 
rights, and benefit indexation, are “onerous” (ACPM 2004, 3). Even though the ACPM 
agreed with the broad direction of the regulators’ initiative, it went well beyond 
CAPSA’s view, defining both the diversity of provincial pension regulations and the 
provinces’ jurisdiction in this field as a problem. Unlike CAPSA, which focused on the 
inconsistency of provincial regulations, the ACPM emphasized the need for reducing 
existing restrictions on plan sponsors. Because of these differences, the ACPM argued 
that an initiative to integrate occupational pension regulations “should be more 
ambitious” (ACPM 2004, 4). 
The Canadian Labour Congress’ (CLC) definition of the problem of regulatory 
fragmentation differed sharply both from the ACPM and CAPSA’s. The trade union 
federation found the regulators’ initiative “unrealistically ambitious” (CLC 2004, 1). 
The CLC agreed with CAPSA that too much regulatory diversity created uncertainty 
among employees, but disagreed strongly with the regulators’ perspective on 
administrative costs. It argued that the gains from regulatory integration would likely be 
very small, stating that “[i]t is striking that while claims in this area are often made 
quite strongly, no one has bothered to estimate the marginal costs to multi-jurisdictional 
plans that result from differences in pension legislation” (CLC 2004, 4). In addition, the 
CLC challenged CAPSA on the issue of regulatory diversity across the provinces. The   17
trade unions doubted that “it is intrinsically desirable to streamline and reduce 
regulation” and saw the diversity of pension regulations not as a problem, but rather as 
an advantage, arguing that it allowed some provinces to provide a high level of 
protection for employees and pensioners (CLC 2004, 2). The CLC specifically 
mentioned Ontario’s grow-in provisions and the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund 
(PBGF), which insures pension benefits against employer insolvency and funding 
shortfalls. To conclude, CAPSA’s focus on the issues of costly administration and 
diverse benefit rules did not facilitate the formation of a shared problem definition 
among provincial governments and key interest groups. Unlike the European 
Commission, the provincial regulators were not successful in shaping the agenda at the 
intergovernmental level. 
Setting the Scope of Regulatory Integration 
Given that policy-makers and interest groups are strongly committed to certain 
aspects of occupational pension regulations, especially those that serve social policy 
objectives, how could proponents of regulatory integration overcome the obstacles to 
creating an agreement among governments? In federal or quasi-federal political 
systems, an intergovernmental consensus on integration is more likely if new, common 
rules give the provinces or member states a sufficient degree of flexibility in applying 
them, and if highly controversial issues remain at, or are delegated to, lower-level 
jurisdictions, which in the European political discourse is known as the subsidiarity 
principle (Streeck 1995; Scharpf 2002). In order to facilitate an intergovernmental   18
agreement, it is thus important that the scope of integration not conflict with the 
fundamental preferences and policy commitments of governments. In this section, we 
compare how the European Commission and CAPSA set the scope of regulatory 
integration, and examine whether or not they were able to create a consensus among 
governments. To analyze the differences between the European and Canadian 
approaches to integration, we divide pension regulations into four categories (see Table 
1): (I) supervision and administration, which includes issues such as registration and 
reporting; (II) funding and investment, which includes the definition and calculation of 
assets and liabilities, the required level of funding, and rules on diversification; (III) 
taxation, which includes the tax treatment of contributions and benefits; and (IV) 
benefit security and adequacy, which includes regulations that serve social policy 
goals.
4 We exclude from our comparative analysis the tax treatment of occupational 
pensions because, while it is an issue in the European Union, it is not one in Canada. 
The federal Income Tax Act has since 1919 provided equal tax advantages for pension 
plans registered in different Canadian provinces (Kaplan 2006, 39-40). 
                                                 
4 On categories of occupational pension regulations, see (Rocha et al. 1999; Queisser 
1998; OECD 2005) 
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Pension Regulation in the European Union 
The European Commission’s strategy for integrating occupational pension 
regulations has relied on the principles of subsidiarity and adaptability, which makes 
intergovernmental negotiations more likely to succeed. Its initiative consisted of three 
related proposals: the proposal for a pension fund directive, which dealt exclusively 
with issues of supervision, administration, funding and investment (European 
Commission 2000), the proposal for a portability directive, which specifically 
addressed the issues surrounding the transfer of pension benefits (European 
Commission 2005), and the proposal for a better coordination of pension taxation 
(European Commission 2001). The pension fund directive was adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in 2003 and is being implemented by 
member states (Haverland forthcoming). Negotiations around the portability directive 
are ongoing. The Commission’s attempt to coordinate the systems of pension taxation 
largely failed in the first round (Council of the European Union 2002).   20
Table 1.  Proposals for Regulatory Integration in the European Union and Canada 
 
  Type of Rule  Examples  Proposed Measures in the EU  Proposed Measures in Canada 






Rules on plan 
administration 
Powers of authorities (PFD* Art. 14) 
Registration or authorization requirements 
(PFD Art. 9) 
Information requirements (PFD Art. 10, 11, 
12, 13) 
Governance requirements (PFD Art. 9, 14) 
Asset separation between company and 
pension plan (PFD Art. 8) 
Powers of authorities (RP Principle 34, 35, 
36) 
Registration requirement (RP Principle 6) 
Information requirements (RP Principles 4, 
9, 12) 
Governance requirements (RP Principles 5, 
6, 7) 
Asset separation between company and 
pension plan (RP Principle 11) 
Surplus decision rules (RP Principle 33) 





Funding requirements (PFD Art. 15, 16, 
17) 
Investment rules (PFD Art. 18) 
Funding requirements (RP Principle 8, FP 
Principles 1-15) 
Investment rules (RP Principle 9) 
III Taxation  Tax  systems, 
Tax agreements 
Tax restrictions and requirements (PTC*) 
Coordination of tax systems (PTC) 
 
Complete integration because of federal 
Income Tax Act 






Compliance with national social and labor 
law (PFD Art. 20) 
Rules on vesting and transferability (PPD* 
Art. 4, 5, 6) 
Eligibility rules (RP Principle 13) 
Entitlement conditions (RP Principles 16, 
17) 
Benefit types (RP Principles 14, 19, 20, 22) 
Rules on vesting and transferability (RP 
Principles 15, 21, 23)  
 
Notes: PFD=pension fund directive (European Commission 2000), PTC=pension taxation communication (European Commission 2001), 
PPD=pension portability directive (European Commission 2005), RP=regulatory principles for a pension model law (CAPSA 2004), FP=funding 
principles for a pension model law (CAPSA 2005) 
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In the pension fund directive, the Commission proposed a set of prudential rules 
that were supposed to remove key barriers to the single market in occupational pension 
provision, give beneficiaries an adequate level of protection, and make pension fund 
investment more secure and efficient (European Commission 2000, 6-7). Following the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Commission deliberately excluded from its proposal any 
changes of rules on pension benefits. It wanted to avoid “any interference in the 
organization of pension systems in member states” and argued that “it is desirable that 
the precise arrangements for the payment of benefits be decided inside the member 
states” (European Commission 2000, 8-9). Article 20 of the proposal thus required a 
pension fund to apply “the relevant social and labour law” of each country in which it 
offers its services. The Commission did not provide a precise definition of social and 
labour law, but stated that the latter relates to “what retirement benefits need to be 
provided” (European Commission 2000, 14). In order to make the mutual recognition 
of member states’ regulatory requirements acceptable to national governments, the 
proposed directive defined a number of minimal standards for the supervision and 
administration of pension funds. However, the Commission recognized that the 
diversity of pension systems “necessarily restricts the degree of prudential 
harmonization that can be attained” (European Commission 2000, 9). The directive 
defined basic powers of regulatory and supervisory authorities and required member 
states either to register or to authorize pension schemes before they started to operate. 
For schemes that operated across borders, registration was not seen as sufficient; prior 
authorization was required. The directive also listed the types of information that 
pension funds needed to submit, or make available on request, to supervisory   22
authorities, members, and beneficiaries, such as changes to the pension plan, statements 
of investment policy, and annual reports. Like the proposed pension fund directive, the 
Commission’s proposal for a directive on portability, which dealt with issues of benefit 
security and adequacy, was developed with the principle of subsidiarity in mind. Thus, 
the proposed directive aimed at coordinating only the small number of regulations 
about membership eligibility and entitlement to benefits that prohibited the free 
movement of workers across borders. Specifically, Article 4 set a limit for minimum 
age rules, requiring that workers acquire pension rights if they are 21 years or older, a 
one-year limit for the waiting period for new employees, and a maximum vesting 
period of two years. In addition, Articles 5 and 6 required pension schemes to give 
workers who leave their current employers the choice between either preserving their 
acquired pension rights or transferring them to the pension scheme of their new 
employer. 
Following the principle of flexibility in implementing common rules, the 
Commission set out only broad requirements for plan governance and thus did not 
prescribe a particular governance structure. Specifically, Article 9 of the pension fund 
directive required that a pension fund be “effectively run by persons of good repute 
who must themselves have appropriate professional qualifications and experience”. It 
was up to the member states to determine the meaning of effective management in the 
context of their respective occupational pension systems. The Commission’s approach 
to funding and investment was as flexible as its approach to supervision and 
administration. Article 15 required that pension schemes calculate their liabilities 
prudently but did not prescribe a method of calculation. The directive merely defined a   23
number of principles that needed to be followed, such as the choice of a prudent interest 
rate. In addition, Article 15 explicitly allowed member states to make the calculation of 
liabilities “subject to additional and more detailed requirements, with a view to 
ensuring that the interests of members and beneficiaries are adequately protected.” 
Article 16 established the principle of full funding, but member states could allow 
temporary underfunding. No exception was made for cross-border pension plans; they 
needed to be fully funded at all times. In Article 18, the proposed directive defined the 
prudent-person principle as the main guideline for investments. Nonetheless, the 
Commission took into account the diversity of investment regulations across member 
states. The directive explicitly allowed the regulatory authorities in each member state 
to “lay down more detailed rules,” including quantitative ones. The Commission argued 
that due to differences in supervisory methods, member states “should be given some 
discretion on the precise investment rules that they wish to require from institutions 
established in their territories” (European Commission 2000, 14). 
Pension Regulation in Canada 
The scope of CAPSA’s proposal was much wider than that of the European 
Commission’s (see Table 1). The proposed rules encompassed not only supervision, 
administration, funding, and investment issues (categories I and II), but also most 
aspects of benefit security and adequacy (category IV). Unlike the European 
Commission, which emphasized the principle of subsidiarity and thus aimed for 
minimal harmonization of occupational pension regulations, CAPSA sought to develop   24
“the basis for a harmonized and simplified model pension statute” (CAPSA 2004, 4). In 
addition to its much wider scope, covering more categories of regulations, CAPSA’s 
proposal had more depth and detail than the European Commission’s. In the area of 
supervision and administration, for example, CAPSA proposed not only measures such 
as registration and information requirements, but also those that deal directly with the 
governance and organization of pension plans. Most importantly, it favored a specific 
governance structure that was modeled after that of the pension committees in the 
province of Quebec (CAPSA 2004, 7-8). In addition, unlike the European 
Commission’s plan, CAPSA’s proposed decision-making rules regarding the 
withdrawal and distribution of funding surpluses. In contrast to the European 
Commission, with its flexible approach, CAPSA suggested very specific rules also for 
the issues of funding and investment. For example, in Proposed Funding Principles for 
a Model Pension Law, CAPSA defined requirements for the calculation of liabilities; 
the European Commission clarified that member states were free to define their own 
actuarial methods. Another example of CAPSA’s restrictive approach is the issue of 
whether employers were allowed to take a contribution holiday. CAPSA included an 
explicit permission in its proposal (Principle 8); the European Commission left this 
question entirely open (Article 9). The Commission did not define the meaning of 
regular financing or specify how to achieve; it required only that pension plans be 
committed to “regular financing” (Arnot 2004, 21). The most important differences 
between CAPSA’s proposal and the Commission’s were in the area of benefit security 
and adequacy (category IV). CAPSA’s proposal went well beyond the regulations that 
are relevant for the mobility of workers, such as vesting and portability rules. It sought   25
to harmonize the types of ancillary benefits that may be provided (Principle 14), the 
time period for early retirement (Principle 16), and the benefit level of survivor 
pensions (Principle 19). In addition, it required the introduction of phased retirement 
(Principle 17) and the provision of death benefits (Principle 20). In contrast to CAPSA, 
the European Commission deliberately avoided any of these measures because it 
thought that they would interfere with member states’ prerogative to organize their 
occupational pension systems. 
Consensus Formation in the European Union and Canada 
EU and Canadian policy-makers and interest groups had different reactions to 
the proposed measures. Even though the member state governments made significant 
changes to the Commission’s proposal, they endorsed its key provisions and reinforced 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and flexibility. On the other hand, the 
provincial governments, which had not added the issue of pension integration to their 
agendas, ignored CAPSA’s proposal for regulatory integration. Their lack of interest in 
the issue was not the only reason for their ignorance; disagreement about many of the 
proposed measures was likely another. The discrepancy between the employers’ and 
the trade unions’ reactions mirrored some of the divisions that existed among provincial 
governments. We argue that the Commission’s focused and flexible approach to 
regulatory integration, which allowed member states to remain responsible for rules to 
which they were committed and to adapt common rules to their domestic contexts, 
facilitated the formation in the EU of an intergovernmental consensus on occupational   26
pensions in the European Union. We also argue that CAPSA’s encompassing and 
relatively rigid set of proposals, which disregarded the desire of provincial governments 
to control regulations on benefits and prescribed in great detail many important features 
of occupational pension systems, prohibited the emergence of a basic agreement on the 
form and content of regulatory integration in Canada. 
In the European Union, the pension fund directive was passed almost 
unanimously in the Council of Ministers. Since issues that concern the single market 
require only a qualified majority in the Council, the only country that voted against it, 
Belgium, could not stop the pension directive’s passage. The pension fund directive 
passed even though the European Parliament, which had proposed more than 100 
amendments, had to approve it (Haverland forthcoming). In order to broaden the 
support from member state governments, the Council of Ministers changed the 
Commission’s proposal and rejected some of the Parliament’s amendments, 
strengthening the protection of member states’ diverse occupational pension systems. 
Stressing the principle of subsidiarity, the Council stated, “it has been of paramount 
importance to the Council that member states should retain full responsibility for the 
organization of their pension systems”  (Council of the European Communities 2002, 
29). Most importantly, the Council made the limits of the pension fund directive more 
explicit than the Commission did. For example, it limited the freedom of pension funds 
to provide services across borders by strengthening the obligation to comply with 
“national social and labour legislation” (Stevens 2004, 11). Respecting the member 
states’ exclusive jurisdiction over social protection, the Council refrained from defining 
the meaning of national social and labour legislation. Thus, member states were   27
expected to decide individually about the rules that they wished to include under this 
provision (Stevens 2004). At the request of the Dutch government, the Council even 
included a specific reference in the directive to national rules regarding compulsory 
membership, which allowed the Netherlands to favor Dutch pension funds (Arnot 2004, 
50). 
Reinforcing the Commission’s flexible approach to regulatory integration, the 
Council made the definition of retirement benefits more restrictive than it had been in 
the original proposal. It criticized the Commission for giving “undue prominence” to 
death and disability benefits and redefined them as ancillary ones (Council of the 
European Communities 2002, 31). Motivated by the goal to allow the adaptation of 
European rules to national contexts, the Council rejected amendments of the European 
Parliament that would have required every occupational pension plan to offer additional 
benefits such as disability payments and survivors’ pensions. Instead, the Council stated 
that members may add such requirements “on a national basis if they desire” (Council 
of the European Communities 2002, 32). In order to prevent interference with national 
pension systems, it also rejected a parliamentary amendment that would have favored 
annuitization over lump-sum payments (Council of the European Communities 2002, 
31).  The Council thus made it possible for Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, and 
other countries to pay some or all of their occupational pensions as a lump sum, 
allowing them to continue their long-standing practices (Arnot 2004, 17). Regarding the 
prudential requirements, the Council strengthened the Commission’s proposal to allow 
member states the introduction of additional investment rules, including quantitative 
limits (Council of the European Communities 2002). The Commission sought to apply   28
this exception only to pension funds located in a member state’s territory, but the 
Council extended it even to funds that were based in other EU member states and 
operated across borders. The Council also introduced exceptions to the principle of 
mutual recognition in regards to information rules (Arnot 2004, 34). Because the 
Commission’s proposal had been built upon the principles of subsidiarity and 
flexibility, which were reinforced in the decision-making process, a consensus could be 
reached both within the Council of Ministers and between the Council and the 
European Parliament. 
In Canada, the intergovernmental decision-making process cannot be examined 
because CAPSA’s proposal failed to reach the agenda of provincial policy-makers. In 
order to estimate the potential for agreement or disagreement about the measures 
proposed by the provincial regulators, the responses of interest groups serve us as a 
rough indicator: if the key stakeholders in the field of occupational pensions strongly 
disagreed, it is unlikely that provincial governments can build a consensus. The 
employers and trade unions were at odds on several issues, for example on the issue of 
pension plan governance. The ACPM, which represents employer interests, was very 
critical of the pension committee model proposed by CAPSA, warning that “the 
requirement for a pension committee with mandatory member representation could by 
itself capsize efforts for uniformity” (ACPM 2004, 8). Even though the ACPM was one 
of the strongest proponents of harmonization, it preferred to preserve the diversity of 
existing governance models. The trade unions took the opposite view. The CLC 
supported CAPSA’s pension committee requirement, but argued that it did not go far 
enough because it did not prescribe joint administration (CLC 2004, 7). A similar   29
disagreement existed about the issue of contribution holidays which was supported by 
the ACPM, but opposed by the CLC (ACPM 2004, 11; CLC 2004, 8). There was also 
no consensus of opinion among the key interest groups about the proposed principles 
related to benefit security and adequacy. Even though the CLC decided not to provide 
detailed comments on CAPSA’s proposal, it criticized the omission of many provisions 
that serve social policy objectives, such as grow-in rights and benefit insurance. In 
addition, the CLC warned that the trade unions “would fight against harmonization 
around some legislative norms” (CLC 2004, 5), referring to those that would lead to a 
reduced protection of members’ pension benefits. Unlike the CLC, the ACPM proposed 
the abolishment of the requirement of grow-in provisions by means of a harmonized 
pension law and criticized the inclusion of phased retirement provisions (ACPM 2004). 
The responses from interest groups suggest that it would be very difficult for 
provincial governments to reach an agreement about many regulations, especially those 
on benefit security and adequacy. Some governments would probably react like the 
Canadian Institute of Actuaries, which found CAPSA’s proposal too far-reaching 
because it incorporated the strictest governance standards and “the most restrictive 
pension standards in Canada” (CIA 2004, 5). Other governments would likely share the 
view of the trade unions, which saw CAPSA’s proposal as too limited because it did 
not seek to be “a leveling-up exercise, notwithstanding the claims that the Model Law 
represents best practices” (CLC 2004, 4). Because CAPSA’s proposal focused on the 
harmonization of most occupational pension regulations, including those that served 
social policy goals, and proposed very detailed rules for a common pension law, a 
consensus, which could not emerge among interest groups, is unlikely to be achieved   30
among provincial governments, if they used CAPSA’s proposal as the basis for future 
negotiations about occupational pension integration. 
Lessons for Integrating Pension Regulations in Canada 
We can draw a number of lessons for Canadian policy-makers from the EU’s 
experience with integrating occupational pension regulations, regarding not only the 
definition of the problems and the scope of regulation, but also the methods of 
integration. The first lesson is that putting the integration of pension regulations on the 
agenda of governments is not as easy as many Canadian actors thought. For example, 
CAPSA found that “many aspects of legislation are fundamentally similar in principle,  
but that they “often differ slightly in their wording and application” (CAPSA 2004). 
While it is true that the Canadian provinces were always much less diverse in 
occupational pension regulations than the EU member states, CAPSA, as we showed in 
our analysis, significantly underestimated the commitment of governments and interest 
groups to existing provincial pension regulations, especially to those that primarily 
concern issues of benefit security and adequacy. In order to develop a problem 
definition on which most provincial governments and key stakeholders could agree, 
Canadian agenda-setters and policy-makers would need to recognize the diverse 
organization of provincial pension systems and seek to protect much of that diversity. 
The second lesson is that building a consensus on an encompassing framework 
for occupational pensions is much more difficult than most Canadian actors, including 
CAPSA, the ACPM and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, have assumed. The   31
European experience suggests that finding common ground on financial regulations is 
perhaps the least difficult problem. But even in that area, EU member states accepted 
only minimal common standards and insisted on numerous exceptions which allowed 
them to maintain some of their national standards under some conditions. The most 
difficult attempt to build a consensus involved regulations that served social policy 
goals. Consequently, the EU’s initiative deliberately excluded from the pension fund 
directive any design features of occupational pension benefits and included in the 
portability directive only those features that were direct obstacles to labour mobility. In 
order to reach a consensus among provincial governments, Canadian policy-makers 
would need to follow a similar strategy; they would need to restrict integration to the 
issues of regulation of pension funding and supervision of pension plans and discuss 
regulations on benefits only if there are compelling reasons for integrating them. 
The final lesson from the EU’s experience is that the debate over the methods of 
integration is too limited. Much of the discussion in Canada revolves around the 
question of whether a single-regulator or multiple-regulator approach is the best one 
and whether there should be more or less harmonization. Since the integration of 
occupational pension regulations involves different policy areas with different actor 
constellations and different possibilities for agreement, the EU has employed multiple 
methods of integration, including minimal harmonization, mutual recognition, and 
voluntary coordination. For example, to integrate prudential rules, the EU relied on 
minimal harmonization and mutual recognition; to encourage the gradual coordination 
of regulations about benefits, it has recently begun to use the Open Method of 
Coordination (Council of the European Union 2001). In order to deal with the mixed   32
character of occupational pension regulations, Canadian policy-makers would need to 
employ an approach that combines several methods. For example, to achieve minimal 
harmonization and mutual recognition of financial regulations, they could create a 
Council of Ministers for Pension Regulation; to begin a coordination of regulations on 
benefit security and adequacy, they could use a voluntary, non-binding peer-review 
process that is similar to the EU’s Open Method of Coordination (Obinger et al. 2005; 
Saint-Martin 2004). To conclude, while integrating occupational pension regulations in 
Canada is difficult, it is certainly feasible.   33
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